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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, ) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRESTWICH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) 
GREGORY L. PRESTWICH, ) Criminal Case No. 041500498 FS 
Defendant/Appellant. ) Appellant Case No. 20060323 CA 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended), where it involves 
an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case, which does not involve a 
conviction of a capital felony or one in the first degree. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal in this case by Appellant are as follows: 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the 
confidential informant (hereafter "CI") was not acting as an agent for law 
enforcement at the time of her entry into Appellant's residence without a search 
warrant? 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether or not the trial court erred in determining that a search 
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warrant was unnecessary before the regional drug task force allowed a CI to enter 
the residence of Appellant to purchase narcotics in circumstances where the buy 
was being controlled through surveillance inside the residence and where there 
appears to be no established probable cause or exigent circumstances? 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether or not the trial erred in finding that the Appellant was 
not entrapped in committing the offense as a matter of law? 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether or not there was sufficient evidence to support the jury 
verdict of guilty and whether or not the jury erred in failing to find entrapment under 
the circumstances of this case? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review is believed to be one of "correctness" as it applies to 
questions of law and the interpretation of statute and a standard of "clearly 
erroneous" as it applies to questions of fact. See State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 
and State v. Rhoades, 818 P.2d 1048 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Gibbons, 
770 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989); and State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence in its 
determination which typically will only be disturbed if it constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts unreasonably. See State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, fl 11, 51 P.3d 55 (quoting State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, 
H20, 989 P.2d 52), cert, denied, 59 P.3d 603 (Utah 2002). Generally, if a case 
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involves a mixed question of fact and law, the Court affords some measure of 
discretion to the trial court's application of the law. The measure of discretion 
afforded varies, however, according to the issue being reviewed. See State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125,1J26, 63 P.3d 670. Little discretion is afforded to the district 
court involving issues, such as the reasonableness of search and seizure, where 
there must be statewide standards that guide law enforcement and prosecutorial 
officials, see State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36,1f12, 78 P.3d 590 (quoting Hansen 2002 
UT 25, H26). Where issues on appeal present questions of statutory interpretation, 
the proper interpretation of the statute is a question of law and reviewed for 
correctness. Rushton v. Salt Lake County. 1999 UT 36,1J17, 977 P.2d 1201. The 
Court of Appeals accords no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court but 
reviews them for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, p , 20 P.3d 300. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Appellant is aware of no statutory provision that is dispositive but believes 
the following apply: 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953, as amended) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1 )(1953 as amended) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE of the CASE: This is a criminal case involving the issues of 
search and seizure and entrapment. The Appellant was arrested after a controlled 
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buy in his residence involving a CI where no search warrant had been issued prior 
to entry of the CI into the residence or apartment of Appellant. The activity of the CI 
was only monitored after she made contact with the Appellant and set up a buy. The 
CI was allowed to make contact with whomever she chose in an attempt to find 
former friends and affiliates in her world of association with drug using friends for 
arranging controlled buys. Appellant was a close enough friend of the CI that they 
had prior dealings with each other in the exchange of controlled substances, where 
one had provided for the other and vice versa over a history of many years. The CI 
set up the buy at the residence of Appellant and exchanged twenty five dollars 
($25.00) for approximately three grams of marijuana. The Appellant was later 
arrested and in the course of the proceedings brought a motion to suppress, 
asserting that the action of law enforcement was improper and violated his Fourth 
Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure. Appellant asserts that law 
enforcement failed to obtain a warrant before entering his residence, that there had 
been established no probable cause or exigent circumstances and/or that the action 
of law enforcement or their CI constituted entrapment as a matter of law. The Court 
denied the motion to suppress. The Appellant took the matter to trial on the 2nd day 
of February, 2006, and was found guilty. 
B. COURSE of PROCEEDINGS and DISPOSITION: The action in question 
took place on or about the 14th day of July, 2004. A warrant for Appellant's arrest 
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was executed and filed on or about the 21st day, and an initial appearance was 
conducted on or about the 23rd day of September, 2004, and the Appellant was 
appointed a public defender. A preliminary hearing was set for the 21st day of 
October, 2004. This was continued to the 10th day of November, 2004, and the 
Court after hearing some of the State's evidence signed a bind over order to the 
allegations as charged. See the record at 35. The Appellant entered not guilty pleas 
thereafter. On or about the 28th day of February, 2005, the matter came before the 
Court on a motion to suppress or limit and on or about May 5, 2005, the Court 
entered its order denying Appellant's motion to suppress supported by findings of 
fact and conclusions of law . See the record at 55 to 65. Appellant went to trial a 
year later, on or about the 2nd day of February, 2006, and the jury returned a verdict 
of guilty. The judgment, sentence and commitment was entered after sentencing on 
the 21st day of March, 2006, which incorporated a stay of execution of sentence with 
order of probation supervised for 36 months and requiring Appellant to serve a term 
of incarceration in the Iron County Jail for a period of 150 days with credit for time 
served, to complete a substance abuse evaluation and complete any treatment or 
aftercare, to complete and pay for a mental health evaluation, consent to the release 
of treatment information and to abide by a curfew for the first 30 days. See the 
record at 177 to 182. A notice of appeal was filed at the request of appellant on or 
about the 3rd day of April, 2006. See the record with its attached Exhibit A at 187 to 
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193. The docketing statement was filed on or about the 3rd day of May, 2006. 
STATEMENT of FACTS 
1. On or about the 14th day of July, 2004, a good friend of Appellant, JAMIE 
ODEN, was utilized as a confidential informant or CI in a monitored or controlled buy 
at the apartment of Appellant. The CI initiated the contact and made the 
arrangements for the purchase and then the local drug task force went through their 
procedure in placing an electronic hearing device on the CI and providing the money 
necessary to purchase the marijuana. See the hearing transcript of the 28th day of 
February, 2005, at Page 11, in the record at 201. 
2. The transaction occurred in the home of the Appellant and the drug task 
force, although aware of the transaction being set up, had not bothered to go to the 
trouble or effort to secure a search warrant. See the hearing transcript of the 28th 
day of February, 2005, at page 40, in the record at 201. 
3. The CI was a long-time friend of the Appellant's and with whom each had 
shared with the other their own supply of marijuana. Each had been involved in the 
other's life at times that were stressful and at times when things were going 
pleasantly, in a general sense a good friendship between them, which was 
established by experiences manifesting trust and loyalty upon which each had come 
to rely. 
4. The CI in this case had made several attempts to purchase marijuana from 
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the Appellant, before he ultimately sold her three grams of marijuana at a cost of 
twenty five dollars ($25.00). See the trial transcript at pages 144-145 in the record 
at 208. 
5. Appellant's residence was located within one thousand (1,000) feet of a 
church and a parking lot and, therefore, the charge was enhanced to a second 
degree felony. 
6. A motion to suppress was held on or about the 28th day of February, 2005. 
The trial judge denied the same, made findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
the matter went to jury trial, which considered as a jury instruction the defense of 
entrapment. The jury found the Appellant guilty and the matter was continued to the 
14th day of March, 2006, for sentencing. 
7. The Court entered its judgment, sentence, stay of execution of sentence, 
order of probation, and commitment on the 21st day of March, 2006, by in large 
adopting the recommendation of Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P), which 
recommendation came as a downward departure from the general matrix that would 
have recommended intermediate sanctions under Appellant's circumstances. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. 
The broad and divergent use of CIs in police action calls for uniform statewide 
standards to guide law enforcement and prosecutorial officials. Fundamental 
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fairness requires that law enforcement adheres to basic due process by following 
established procedures for securing a warrant before entering a private residence. 
For warrantless entry into a residence to meet judicial scrutiny, there must be 
probable cause or exigent circumstances. The typical CI in this setting is inherently 
unreliable, which should be more seriously scrutinized by judicial authority. The 
emphasis on agency misdirects the focus of the problem, which is to allow 
investigative techniques to delude Fourth Amendment protection to private citizens. 
B. 
The trial court erred in not suppressing evidence, the State exploiting the 
relationship between the CI and the Appellant, which was a long-term close 
relationship. Exploitation of such relationships is not often apparent from the present 
contact between the parties, where actions and words have greater meaning and 
significance. The fact finder erred in not considering such circumstances as part of 
the judicial instruction for entrapment and the trial court erred in not granting 
Appellant's motion to dismiss or limit. Failure to take such action condones the 
inappropriate conduct of law enforcement through its unchecked use of CIs. 
C. 
The facts and circumstances of Koury and McArthur are different and 
distinguishable from those of Appellant's case. Both cases involved circumstances 
where permission was granted to the witness before becoming a CI. Both involved 
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circumstances where the CI was simply reporting on events that had already been 
perpetuated by the accused. The CI's involvement is that of a passive witness. In 
the instant case, the CI is not just reporting but inducing the accused to commit the 
criminal act gaining access by false pretense and without a warrant where there is 
no probable cause or exigent circumstances, influenced by the pressures of a long-
term relationship, factors not readily apparent from the monitored contact. 
D. 
Good judgment requires proper perspective. Where the focus of procedure 
presently looks to factors such as agency and requiring a defendant to establish 
entrapment before allowing a jury to consider such as a defense, judicial review and 
oversight should focus more closely upon and scrutinize law enforcement techniques 
and procedures that pose the greatest risk of deluding fundamental protection to 
private citizens such as requiring a search warrant before entering the residence of 
an accused. It is unlikely that such protection will result from legislative attention and 
the jury, at least without proper focus and instruction on such matters, will likely not 
consider factors that would have an impact upon such constitutional protection. 
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ARGUMENTS 
A. 
THE BROAD AND DIVERGENT USE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN 
POLICE ACTION CALLS FOR UNIFORM STATEWIDE STANDARDS TO 
GUIDE LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORIAL OFFICIALS. 
The present case is an example of the broad use of CIs by the multi-county 
drug task force in southern Utah. It is similar to the cases of State v. Edwards and 
State v. Smith1. These cases involve entry into a residence without a search 
warrant, and are similar because the CI was not directed by law enforcement, but 
rather left to her own devices to set up the Appellant in criminal activity. The cases 
are similar in showing various examples relative to how such agents are used, of the 
types of efforts employed to entice one into criminal activity. The issue of course, 
is whether such conduct constitutes entrapment. 
In the prior cases, the use of the CI who was a part of a close or special 
lfThe Court decided State v. Edwards, case number 20050112-CA 
in April, 2006, as 2006 UT App. 148. Petition for writ of 
certiorari was filed with the Utah Court of Appeals thereafter 
and is pending further decision. This Court presently has before 
it State v. Smith, appellate case number 20050977-CA. At the time 
of the filing of this brief, a reply brief had yet to be filed 
and the matter has yet to be considered or set for oral argument. 
There are factual distinctions between the three cases. However, 
the legal arguments are fundamentally and predominately the same. 
Counsel for Appellant believes the distinctions are significant 
enough to warrant the filing of this brief rather than asserting 
the claims to be non-meritorious given the Court of Appeals' 
recent decision in State v. Edwards. 
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relationship in one form or another and in that regard this case is of the same type. 
The Appellant and the CI had a long-term friendship which involved the exchange 
and use of marijuana over a period of many years, the two having first met in the 
year of 1999. In each case, the amount of leverage applied or the pressure from 
enticement cannot be measured merely by the simple words used or the isolated 
circumstances of each single incident. This Appellant asserts that it is impossible 
to accurately quantify or qualify the kind of influence or pressure that can result from 
long-term or special relationships, which is not obvious from the single contact. 
Such uncertainty cannot be fully ascertained or measured in a manner that could 
establish a consistent standard for implementation and regulation as concerning 
potential defendants. However, the Appellant asserts that such a standard can and 
should be applied to establish uniform statewide standards for the use of CIs. 
Point No. 1 
Law Enforcement should Adhere to Basic Due Process by Following 
Established Procedures of Securing a Warrant before Entering a Private 
Residence. 
In State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, the Utah Supreme Court addressed this 
same issue involving search and seizure within the scope of a traffic stop, and as 
part of its analysis, addressed the standard of review. It stated quite appropriately 
that in cases involving mixed questions of fact and law, the reviewing court should 
afford some measure of discretion to the trial court's application of the law and this 
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measure of discretion varies according to the issue reviewed. The Supreme Court 
then stated: 
When a case involves consent to search, we afford little discretion to the district 
court because there must be 'statewide standards that guide law enforcement 
and prosecutorial officials.' Id. at tf26; see also State v. Truman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1271 (Utah, 1993). 
What seemed clear and evident to the Supreme Court on an issue involving 
consent in a search of an automobile, is even more overwhelmingly necessary and 
evident when the consent to search involves a home or residence of an accused. 
In Hansen, the Supreme Court went on to state that statewide standards help ensure 
that different trial judges reach the same legal conclusion in cases that have little 
factual difference. Where its analysis involved the legality of the search, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the district court's determination of the law was to be 
afforded no deference by the reviewing court. Id. The Appellant asserts that the 
same standard should be applied in this case. In fact, it is believed by many that 
there should be heightened consideration when the search and seizure involves a 
warrantless search of a residence or home, and therefore, scrutinized more closely. 
In State v.Warren, 2003 UT 36, the Utah Supreme Court saw fit to apply this 
standard to a situation involving a Terry Frisk stop, which this Appellant believes in 
comparison to be a circumstance of lesser compelling interest. 
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in that case stated as follows: 
When a case involves the reasonableness of a search and seizure, we afford little 
discretion to the trial court because there must be statewide standards that guide 
law enforcement and prosecutorial officials (additional citations omitted). Id.fl12. 
The reason for doing so was expressed by the Supreme Court again, stating 
that it was to ensure that different trial judges reach the same legal conclusion in 
cases where there is little factual difference. In the instant case, the circumstances 
are not factually different than those found in either State v. Edwards or State v. 
Smith in that the three involve the use of a CI to obtain information and entering into 
the residence of an accused without the agency first securing a search warrant. 
The cases are also similar in that in each, the warrantless search could be 
considered a per se Fourth Amendment violation because it is does not fall within 
an articulated exception. The warrantless search is a per se Fourth Amendment 
violation unless the State can establish one of the "few specially established and well 
delineated exceptions." See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L Ed. 2d 576 
(1967) (further citations omitted). 
Point No. 2 
For Warrantless Entry into a Residence to meet Judicial Scrutiny, there 
must be Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances. 
The use of a CI in entering the residence of a private citizen is not recognized 
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as one of the established and well delineated exceptions. The trend has been to 
protect the citizen's expectation of privacy. In State v. Beavers, 857 P.2d 9 (Utah 
App.1993), the Utah Court of Appeals conducted its assessment of a warrantless 
entry as follows: 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "'the right of the people to be secure' in their 
persons and houses...against unreasonable searches and seizures. When police 
make a seizure, Fourth Amendment analysis begins with an assessment of 
whether the seizure occurred in a place where a person has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. See State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).... 
Physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
Fourth Amendment is directed, see United States v. United States District Court, 
407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 2134, 32 L Ed. 2d 752 (1972). Consequently, 
warrantless searches and seizures within the home and other private premises 
are per se unreasonable absent exigent circumstances (citations omitted)." 
Absent exigent circumstances, the threshold may not be reasonably crossed 
without a warrant. See Peyton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 
1380, 63 L.Ed. 2d. 639 (1980) (emphasis added). 
This Court, in Beavers, went on to clarify that the State bears a particularly 
heavy burden of proving that the warrantless entry into a home falls within 
established exigent circumstances. Id. In the context of the hot pursuit exception, 
this Court stated what it believed to be the general rule, that a warrantless entry of 
a private residence must be qualified "by probable cause and exigent 
circumstances." Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
In the instant case, a search warrant was never obtained. The CI, acting by 
and in behalf of law enforcement, was allowed to enter into the residence and 
conduct a controlled buy while under surveillance, which required her to be wired by 
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other law enforcement officers. 
The CI was sent into the residence without corroboration or confirmation that 
the Appellant was involved in criminal activity. In other words, the information was 
not corroborated through any independent source. There was no established 
probable cause. The CI was one who had previously worked with law enforcement 
and provided reliable information, but in this case, the information involved 
conducting a controlled buy within a residence of a private citizen after entering 
without a warrant even though there was sufficient time in which to secure one. The 
CI had even failed to disclose the name of Appellant at the time of applying to be a 
CI. See the hearing transcript of February 28,2005, at page 34 in the record at 201. 
The actions of the CI were in desperation and fear of losing her child and being sent 
to prison. Id. at page 16. The CI utilized the manipulative techniques of empathy 
and pity to get the Appellant to supply the marijuana. Id. at pages 50 and 51 and 60 
and 62. The Appellant involved himself in the transaction to curb what he viewed as 
continuing harassment from his friend whom he had an understanding suffered 
severely from drug addiction. Id. The problem seems to arise from the fact that law 
enforcement allowed the CI to operate without proper direction, supervision or 
standards. 
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Point No. 3 
The Information provided by a typical confidential informant in this setting 
is inherently unreliable, which should be more seriously scrutinized by 
judicial authority. 
The fact that this matter involved a friend of many years, one where their joint 
relationship was based upon trust that involved their mutual use of marijuana, calls 
into question the fact finder's ability to assess or weigh the pressure or influence 
exerted upon the Appellant by simply viewing the matter in the context of their 
present contact. There seems to be something fundamentally unfair in a process 
that chooses to flatly ignore influence or pressure which is not obvious by the 
dialogue of the actors, but does clearly exist beneath the surface as a result of their 
long association. It is, however, more unsettling that the process becomes one by 
which the CI2 now decides who should be investigated and prosecuted. This is 
because the drug task force has empowered her to do so. 
The Appellant asserts that this procedure cries out for some type of restraint 
to apply the same standard practices and procedures observed uniformly on a 
2In this context, Appellant excludes the CI who is the 
concerned citizen who has no vested interest in the enterprise 
but volunteers information to the law enforcement agency because 
they view it as their duty to do so as a law-abiding citizen 
concerned about what they may have inadvertently witnessed. 
Conversely, the typical CI who works with the drug task force is 
a drug user with a criminal record and reputation for still using 
within the drug community. 
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statewide basis by law enforcement officers in other areas when such procedures 
are scrutinized and/or monitored. Without such, the Appellant maintains that the CI 
makes a mockery of the investigative process by tarnishing law enforcement's 
reputation of maintaining high standards of integrity and reliability and upon which 
the public or jury has come to rely in all aspects, including one of honesty and 
propriety. 
There simply does not appear to be a compelling reason to distinguish the 
actions of an uncontrolled CI as somehow reasonable and proper when law 
enforcement itself cannot make such entry, contact or surveillance through their own 
use of enhanced techniques, equipment or personnel. 
In other words, this is just another form of unlawful search and seizure and 
where such evidence is obtained, the appropriate course of action should be to 
suppress the evidence. 
As articulated by Chief Justice Durham in State v. Larocko, 794 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1990) the Supreme Court states: 
The principle of evidence obtained as a result of unlawful search and seizure 
should not be admitted at trial was not adopted until relatively recent times in 
Utah.... We now expressly hold that exclusion of illegally obtained evidence as a 
necessary consequence of police violations of Article I, Section 14. Id. at 472. 
In that case, the activity mandating suppression of the evidence was nothing 
more than to open an unlocked car door to find the Vehicle Identification Number 
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(VIN) when the officer had good reason to suspect that the car had been stolen. 
The Court reasoned, which interestingly is no different in the present case, 
that since the officer could have easily obtained a warrant for the search of the car, 
simply opening the door to inspect the VIN constituted an unreasonable search 
under Utah law. 
The action taken in the instant case is far more intrusive. How one could 
consider the action taken by the officer in Larocko as being inappropriate and at the 
same time consider the action taken by the CI in this case as being appropriate, is 
beyond a sensible explanation. Any distinction appears to be more arbitrary than 
well reasoned. 
Even if the action taken by the drug task force in using a particular CI appears 
sensible and reasonable, where the process itself is subject to manipulation and 
selective prosecution where control is entirely in the hands of the CI, the procedure 
cannot be condoned. In almost every instance, the activity of the CI is not seriously 
questioned, whereas if such conduct or technique were administered by a law 
enforcement officer, the same would be closely scrutinized. The double standard 
is one that is exploited by law enforcement in the use of special drug task forces, at 
least in southern Utah. 
In short, law enforcement's use of the CI bypasses significant constitutional 
requirements. Under most circumstances, the CI is not even monitored to determine 
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whether he or she is complying with the law in other areas as part of their agreement 
with the task force. There is evidence of that in this case with other buys made by 
the CI unknown to the task force. See the hearing transcript of the 28th day of 
February, 2005, at pages 56-57, in the record at 201. Where the CI is left to her own 
devices to involve Appellant in a criminal enterprise, the task force is a party to the 
operation whether she is acting as their agent or otherwise. To ignore such 
inducement because the same is not under the control of the task force or agency 
is like drawing an arbitrary line drawn in the shifting sands of innovative techniques 
in police procedure. The Appellant maintains that if such activity cannot be 
maintained within the established practices required of law enforcement, then such 
actions should not be condoned as proper or appropriate investigative technique or 
procedure when using CIs. 
Point No. 4 
The Analysis on Agency Misdirects the Focus on the Problem, which is to 
not allow Investigative Techniques to delude Fourth Amendment Protection 
to Private Citizens. 
Most district court judges address this matter not in the context of unwarranted 
surveillance but rather as an issue involving agency. That is, whether or not the CI 
should be considered an agent of the government, given the circumstances of each 
case. This simply confuses the issue and makes a mockery of fundamental 
protections. 
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The fact that the CI is acting on her own, more or less as a rogue agent, does 
not instill confidence that proper procedures and techniques will be applied in an 
investigation. In fact, it flies in the face of it. 
An example of this might be noted in the case of State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474 
(Ut. App. 1991). In that case, the Court of Appeals discussed the issue of when a 
private individual acts as an agent of the government in conducting a search and/or 
seizure, stating that the search is a governmental act and must comply with the 
Fourth Amendment, see also the United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,113,104 
S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85 (1984), and Article I, Section 14, of the Utah 
Constitution. In Koury, this Court stated that the government cannot use informants 
to do for them what they cannot legally do for themselves. See also State v. Watts. 
750 P.2d 1219,1220, (Utah 1998). This Court went on to state that when it believes 
the person's intended purpose for being in the residence is to perpetrate the interest 
of law enforcement rather than preserve his or her own personal interest, then the 
person is unquestionably an agent for the State. In the recent unpublished decision 
of State v. Edwards, this Court states that the actions of the CI in that case 
amounting to enablement to make methamphetamine, were the actions of a private 
citizen and not governmental. In doing so, it flatly ignores the most obvious and 
fundamental fact in the case, which is that the CI had an arrangement with the task 
force to work for them under contract. This is not the action of a concerned private 
Page 21 of 42 
citizen. In Edwards, the CI was operating under the pressure of it being his last 
chance to make good on a deal with the task force; that is, to bring someone down 
or go back to prison himself. If he had any personal interest to pursue in that 
situation, it was to perpetrate the objectives of the task force and keep himself out 
of jail. Calling the action personal or governmental does not change matters or help 
resolve the issue. 
In the instant case, there is no question. The CI testifies accordingly. See 
hearing transcript of the 28th day of February, 2005, at page 22, in the record at 201. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the CI made it clear to all that she would 
not have been there except for the fact that she was acting on behalf of the task 
force. Id. 
In Kourv. this Court was clear in stating that law enforcement could not create 
its own exigent circumstance in order to justify its warrantless entry. That is exactly 
what takes place by sending in a CI to the residence of its target or suspect. See 
also State v. Munoz Giarra, 788 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1986). This is called attenuation. 
That is, even if a search is conducted pursuant to a recognized exception as to the 
per se rule, such as by permission, it is invalid if it was obtained by law 
enforcement's exploitation of some prior illegality, such as the inducement under 
false pretense. See State v. Hamm, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996); see also State 
v. Harmon. 854 P.2d 1037 (Utah App.) cert granted. 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993). 
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Can there really be any question that the activity of the CI for the drug task 
force in this instance, constitutes an intrusion into the Appellant's home that violates 
his right to privacy. Such intrusion mandates that the matter be analyzed in the 
context of a warrantless search with a presumption of illegality unless the Court finds 
that the officers had both probable cause and exigent circumstances justifying their 
intrusion but not created or exploited by them. 
While permission can generally be considered as an exception, the Appellant 
argues that it should not apply in this case because the permissive circumstance is 
a part of the governmental agency's investigation and is used by the CI to gain entry, 
constituting an attenuation of the circumstance. Likewise, the matter can be viewed 
from the standpoint that the same is obtained under false pretenses and as a 
consequence, the circumstance one exploited by the governmental agency. 
Law enforcement should not be allowed to justify what would otherwise be an 
illegal entry by exploiting the fact that the CI was allowed to enter the residence 
under such false pretenses. That is to say, law enforcement created the 
circumstance, they are not entitled to use it to justify their action for a warrantless 
entry. 
More importantly, where is the probable cause? The CI clearly states at trial 
and at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress that at the time of entry, he 
only had suspicion of Appellant's involvement in illegal activity. His prior experience 
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with Appellant went back twenty years. He had mentioned only informal and 
infrequent contact with the Appellant in recent years. See the trial transcript at pages 
202 to 207 in the record at 239. There was no evidence of prior criminal activity. 
Law enforcement had its suspicions, but at this time in their investigation, both the 
CI and law enforcement were relying upon the CI's close relationship to the 
Appellant to induce him to sell drugs. 
In other words, they had no probable cause and would likely not have received 
the warrant had the matter been scrutinized by a magistrate. The requirement 
should be in place to check the activity and procedure using a CI. Specifically, this 
is a procedure that should be scrutinized before entry into a private residence, not 
after. To do nothing, and thereby validate such law enforcement activity deludes 
the fundamental principles of protection and privacy to a matter of no concern 
affording the greater protection to circumstances involving a Terry Frisk or traffic 
stop. When the CI has control over the process and the ability to manipulate or 
thwart the efforts of law enforcement selectively, the circumstances cry out for 
oversight. 
The CI, at least those employed in circumstances similar to the instant case 
where they are themselves criminals looking to get out from under their own criminal 
charges, it becomes a matter of concern to the general public how they go about 
setting up people for drug buys. It is because of this concern that the critical part 
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the procedure now involves observation, monitoring, and control of their activities. 
In a typical situation, the CI is searched prior to being wired and sent into a 
controlled buy environment and then searched again afterwards. This is done 
because the integrity of the CI is in question. The monitoring is typically by visual 
observation by another part of the team and a wire is placed upon the CI among 
other things to ensure that the CI does not do or say anything contrary to the 
circumstances set in motion by the controlled buy. In other words, the activities of 
the CI are monitored, recorded, and controlled in part because they are unreliable. 
However, in this case, the CI is given what amounts to carte blanche to go out and 
find somebody to set up. 
While the task force has the ability to monitor it chooses not to when the CI 
is out looking for a target. In fact, those who may know what the asset is capable 
of seem to turn a blind eye to allow him to act on his own, more or less as a rogue 
agent, to set up who he will in whatever circumstance he might and then to report 
back to the task force when he has something useful. 
It is the Appellant's contention that this is an open invitation for corruption and 
manipulation. This flies in the face of established procedures and controls that have 
justified the use of this type of law enforcement technique. More importantly, it 
unreasonably puts the public directly at risk by exposing it to the unchecked activities 
of individuals who have in the past exhibited a propensity toward criminal activity to 
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work the system to their benefit often in blatant disregard to rules, laws and 
procedure to which law enforcement would otherwise be subjected. 
Ultimately, there is simply no uniformity in the operation from one community 
to the next. What might be an accepted practice and basis for procedure in one 
district will vary substantially and completely in the next county, community or before 
a different judge. If there has ever been a case that seems to cry out for a need for 
uniform statewide standards and procedures, it is the use of CIs. 
The Appellant contends that whatever minimum standard might be applied on 
a statewide basis would at least respect precedent in requiring a search warrant 
when such inducement takes place within the residence of a private citizen. 
B. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE 
NOTWITHSTANDING ITS ALLOWANCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION ON 
ENTRAPMENT, THE STATE EXPLOITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THE CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT AND THE APPELLANT, WHICH WAS A 
LONG-TERM, CLOSE RELATIONSHIP FOR MANY YEARS. 
In Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-2-303(1 )(1953 as amended), the basis 
for the entrapment defense is set forth statutorily. The statute focuses on conduct 
of law enforcement, by and through its agents, not necessarily the conduct of the 
offender. See State v. Belt. 780 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Utah Supreme Court has found entrapment where the State exploits a 
close personal relationship involving inducement by a persistent request, see State 
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v. Courvelas, 621 P.2d 1238 (Utah 1980), and State v. Taylor. 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1979). 
In State v. Spraque. 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme Court 
found entrapment where a defendant sold marijuana after persistent requests by an 
undercover agent where the agent first approached the defendant with no prior 
knowledge that he was involved in drugs and when the defendant testified that he 
made the sale in order to be a friend to the police officer. 
It is obvious that the Court in that case saw more to the arrangement than 
simply the words exchanged or the dialogue between the parties. The relationship 
of the parties to each other and the expectations of the parties involved are factors 
that can and should be considered. Nevertheless, the standard is clearly whether 
the inducement would be effective to persuade a reasonable person to commit an 
offense, not just to afford such a person the opportunity to do so. This is clearly 
something that is by and large subject to the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case. That is, the matter is one within the providence of the fact finder 
unless so obvious that a judge can see no other possible conclusion from the 
evidence. 
The Appellant believes that there are some areas of exploitation that are so 
clear and obvious that as a matter of law, entrapment should be found since the 
same create such a substantial risk that an offense would be committed that there 
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is no reason to afford deferential consideration given minor factual distinctions 
between cases. 
This is another indication as to why clear standards should be established in 
the practice and procedure for utilizing CIs. In the instant case, the CI and the 
Appellant were close friends of many years. They had associated with each other 
in various settings. They shared drugs together back and forth at different periods 
of time. Each had provided to the other on various occasions marijuana. They had, 
in fact, established a relationship between themselves that was based upon a 
foundation of trust and fidelity, not unlike that of fidelity or a relationship between an 
employer and employee over a long period of time or in a close family relationship 
that is long-term. The nature of such relationships include factors and 
considerations beyond simple words expressed and often involve acts of loyalty and 
commitment that are done at the request or benefit of one party for the other without 
consideration of personal involvement, risk or sacrifice. Allowing the State to exploit 
the nature of that relationship and treat it as though this was a simple acquaintance 
along the street turns a blind eye to the strong potential for exploitation. More 
importantly, the exploiting factor in the equation again becomes the CI. 
Given the practices and procedures exercised by the drug task force at least 
in this case, there is no check to ensure that the CI has not manipulated or exploited 
the process. One might state that this can be monitored by simply making visual 
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observation and electronic monitoring of the CI at the time of the actual sale, but 
Appellant argues that such is insufficient and equates to a circumstance no more 
convincing than trying to describe the interior of a room by looking through a 
keyhole. Many years of a close, continuous relationship between two people, who 
at times in their lives considered the other to be a dependable friend, has much more 
to it than what is set out as being the conversation between them on the telephone 
or at the Appellant's residence, a sum total of about 15 minutes of conversation and 
interaction between them on that day. It is a farce to look at that 15 minutes and say 
that there is no issue of entrapment raised sufficient to allow an instruction to the jury 
on one hand, as in the case of State v. Smith, but yet sufficient to allow for such an 
instruction as in this case to be given on entrapment consistent with the statute but 
not factoring in consideration of the long-term relationship beyond mere outward 
expression. 
The real farce is upon the integrity of law enforcement practices and 
procedures, which through the years have been established, at least through the 
judicial process, of requiring the highest order of conduct within a police 
investigation. This undertaking condones the activity of a CI whose actions are at 
least asserted by the Appellant in this case to be no different than his own, and 
places the reputation of law enforcement upon the same stage and in the same 
context of the activities of those they are prosecuting. 
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There was no evidence in this case that Appellant was disposed to commit 
criminal activity without the involvement of the CI. While the representative from the 
task force testified that he had heard nothing regarding this particular Appellant or 
his criminal activity and that his name was not one initially disclosed by the CI at the 
time she applied for the position, the action for the task force is condoned as though 
it was not a party to the transaction but simply there to observe. In this case, the CI 
testifies that she would not have been there had it been for her contractual obligation 
to the task force and that she was doing this as a last act in saving herself from 
being arrested on a probation violation and sent to prison. The Appellant testifies 
that several attempts were made by her prior to getting him to sell her marijuana and 
on all previous occasions he refused. The Appellant testifies that his reason for 
selling her the marijuana on this occasion was because he felt sorry for her and 
empathized with what she was going through in dealing with her addiction to 
smoking marijuana. The problem in this case is the same as it has been in other 
cases. That is, the CI's ability to manipulate the entire process. The CI is pretty 
much left to find whoever he or she will to succumb to the purchase of illegal 
substances and is allowed to do so without any type of supervision or standard in 
which to keep the operation above board. Appellant argues that without such 
standards, it is left entirely up to the agency to monitor their CIs as they deem 
appropriate but with the inclination toward allowing them to simply set up whoever 
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they will and using whatever resources or influence within their control. Moreover, 
nothing is corroborated. 
In this case, criminal action was initiated by the inducement of the CI based 
upon her hunch or suspicion that she could get the Appellant to buy from her. In 
Taylor, the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
Officers of government may afford opportunities to commit crime by employing 
artifice and strategists to apprehend persons engaged in criminal enterprise. 
However, they cannot implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to 
commit the offense and to induce its commission in order to prosecute. 
That is to say, the focus is not the Appellant's propensity or predisposition as 
much as it is upon law enforcement's conduct in their proper use of governmental 
power. As stated above, the question becomes whether or not the conduct of the 
government comports to a fair and honorable administration of justice. How can 
such be accomplished without proper standards or practices established for the use 
of CIs. Given that the potential for exploitation, to have no such standards, is the 
equivalent of stating that law enforcement places no emphases upon its fair and 
honorable administration of justice. In fact, the approach prevents active 
inducements for the purpose of luring a person into the commission of an offense. 
The government is not permitted to engage in the manufacturing of a crime such as 
occurred with the CI in State v.Edwards. The duty of law enforcement is the 
prevention of crime through the apprehension of those who, without inducement, are 
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engaged in the commission of criminal activity. Exploiting a long-term relationship 
between friends when the CI is in fact the one initiating the purchase of drugs, and 
where as evidence suggests that her integrity is questionable, by the CI's prior use 
and lack of observation by the drug task force, the judicial authority becomes the 
only check on the process. If a CI is allowed to go unchecked, having influence and 
power to manipulate and exploit the entire process, she becomes the point to the 
sword of the whole law enforcement investigation and the prosecution process. In 
short, she is allowed to participate in a criminal enterprise and exonerate herself 
from all participation or activity by exposing one of the projects that she helped set 
up. 
In the present case, the CI is allowed to avoid her own prosecution by setting 
up her close friend. In any case, these are not exactly points that lead one to believe 
that the information is credible and reliable. Rather, one is struck with a sense that 
such motivation for participating in that sort of enterprise causes one to question and 
probe beneath the surface to determine whether or not there are extenuating 
circumstances. 
The Appellant asserts that if there is a situation where the potential for 
manipulation is so apparent that the information or participation received or caused 
by such activity rises to a level of per se unreliability, then the same should be 
treated as entrapment as a matter of law and decided upon by the trial court, not left 
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to a jury to consider. More importantly, it demonstrates once again the need for well 
defined standards consistent from one jurisdiction to another. How can the use of 
such questionable investigative practices be without accepted rules or standards 
upon which to operate? If this case stands for anything, it is as another testament 
to the potential for corruption and manipulation of the unchecked, uncontrolled or 
unsupervised use of CIs, even with law enforcement as a partner, without 
established standards and practices and to not compromise the standard of law 
enforcement. At the very least, given the circumstances of this case, the trial court 
erred in not deciding entrapment as a matter of law and allowing the matter to be 
considered by the jury in the form of a jury instruction which did not go beyond the 
language utilized in the statute itself. Not giving an informative and comprehensive 
jury instruction was the same as informing the jury that it could not consider factors 
beyond the most obvious recent communication or expression between the parties 
involved. 
Having said that, however, Appellant did not object nor take exception to the 
instruction given and for that matter may not have preserved the right to challenge 
the jury instruction given. Counsel for Appellant believes that the instruction as given 
is consistent with the statutory language and, therefore, is correct and proper to the 
extent that it is given but fails to consider factors beyond the most obvious exchange 
of dialogue or interaction between the parties and does not take into account factors 
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that are less obvious and yet present from circumstances that are more long-term 
and subtle in nature. As a result, the Appellant believes that the trial court erred in 
not finding entrapment as a matter of law or in allowing the jury to decide whether 
or not entrapment existed. 
C. 
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER KOURY AND MCARTHUR ARE 
DIFFERENT AND DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THOSE OF APPELLANT'S 
CASE. 
Similar to the cases of Edwards and Smith, there was an evidentiary hearing 
in this case where it was determined that the CI was a friend of many years to the 
Appellant where they would on rare occasions smoke marijuana, the one provided 
for the other and vice versa and where the relationship was one based upon trust 
and integrity for one toward the other. The Appellant testified that only upon her 
persistence did he agree to sell the marijuana to the CI. As with the other cases 
mentioned, this one involved her entering into the residence of Appellant and the 
same was done without first securing a search warrant but while she was under the 
employ or mandate of the regional governmental drug task force. The trial court in 
denying Appellant's motion to suppress relied upon this Court's ruling in State v. 
McAurthur. 996, P.2d 555 (Ut. App. 2000) and State v. Koury, 824, P.2d 474 (Ut. 
App. 1991). Both of those cases stand for the proposition that the fourth amendment 
does not protect the wrong doer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he 
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voluntarily confides his wrong doing will not reveal it. However, the Appellant asserts 
that both cases are distinguishable from the circumstances of the present case for 
a number of reasons. First, in McArthur, the informant was a person who had 
actually been living with the accused and his mother in his mother's home. Even 
though she was in the process of moving out of the residence when the officer 
approached her and she volunteered to go back to retrieve some of the items she 
had identified as being part of the burglary done by the accused, it was a fact that 
she had to return to the house to get the rest of her belongings and her permission 
to do so had long been established because of her living there. 
In Koury. the accused gave the key to his home to a friend to care for his pets 
while he was away for a month. In doing so, the friend saw a plant that he thought 
to be marijuana and contacted authorities. Law enforcement asked him to retrieve 
the plant, which he did because he had permission for an entirely different purpose, 
to care for the pets, which allowed entry onto the premises. That is to say, the 
obtained permission was not part of a pretext for gaining entry into the residence 
anymore than it was a part of the criminal activity, which had happened prior to 
permission being given. 
In each case, the permission came before the person became a CI This is 
distinguishable because even though the CI has been a long-time friend of Appellant 
and has in the past been invited into the Appellant's home for activities that included 
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illegal drug use, there is no standing order of permission. The CI is attempting to 
enter the residence under false pretense acting as a CI for the drug task force, under 
contract and having so acted in the past for several weeks and made several 
attempts at purchasing buys in a controlled buy situation prior to this event with 
Appellant. 
Another distinguishing feature that seems to have been lost in the district 
court's comparison of the cases to the present case, is that in both McArthur and 
Koury, the informants are not part of the criminal activity or enterprise. In both 
cases, they are observers after the criminal activity had occurred. In McArthur, it is 
not a situation where law enforcement is attempting to induce the accused to commit 
a burglary anymore than in Koury is the CI attempting to induce the accused to 
cultivate marijuana. However, in this case, the CI is attempting to induce the 
Appellant into a criminal enterprise and is the one initiating the activity. To say that 
such an individual is simply providing the opportunity for one disposed to commit 
criminal activity ignores the fact that it occurs in the residence of the Appellant, 
without a search warrant, under a false pretense and manipulating the long-term 
friendship and association of one friend to another. To say that such factors are not 
significant in assessing Appellant's decision to participate in such activity, is like 
trying to say that sunshine has no effect on how plants grow. While the direct impact 
cannot be measured or assessed on the obvious nature of it. It is such that it cannot 
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be ignored nor diminished for purposes of assessing its influence or significance. 
More importantly, the CI in this case is not simply a passive observer with 
information to report. Rather, she is an active participant and, in fact, the primary 
force perpetuating the activity. Surely, this Court is correct in asserting that a 
wrongdoer should not benefit from volunteering information about his prior criminal 
activity to one upon whom he has misplaced his trust. But this case goes far beyond 
that. This is a case where a CI induces the Appellant into criminal activity. The 
observer is not passively observing. She is inducing. To extend the doctrine of 
Koury and McAurthur to include actions of inducement and then call such action 
personal instead of governmental and thus of no consequence is just plain wrong. 
The issue is not the activity of the accused but the activity of law enforcement in 
conducting its investigation that should be scrutinized. 
Appellant asserts that it is but another reason why it makes sense to establish 
statewide uniform standards and procedures for the use of CIs so that state 
investigative techniques and procedures are not compromised by the activities of 
unreliable CIs. Had such procedures been in place in this case as is evident from 
both Koury and McArthur, where in both a search warrant was in fact secured prior 
to arrest, the Appellant believes that the use of CIs would constitute less of a risk to 
the public in general, where now it poses a severe risk given the unreliability and 
uncontrolled activity of such agents because standards have not been established. 
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Appellant further believes that this action will only be instituted at the mandate 
of the Court of Appeals. In this case, the trial lasted the better part of a day. The 
jury was given several instructions, including an entrapment defense instruction, and 
advised to deliberate. The jury returned its verdict after more than ten minutes of 
deliberation but within two hours. Certainly, a lot can be inferred from the different 
time periods for deliberation. However, the travesty of the circumstance is still the 
same that the Appellant was found guilty because the jury it would seem ignored the 
evidence presented and from which could be contemplated the impact or effect of 
subtle influence in a long-term relationship. There is no question that those on the 
watchtower who protect these interests are those that have an understanding of the 
problem and a desire to preserve the established constitutional protections. As for 
the public at large, the subtleties upon which this Appellant asks this Court to make 
distinction seem to be beyond them to understand or appreciate. 
D. 
GOOD JUDGMENT REQUIRES PROPER PERSPECTIVE. 
The matters pending before the Court of Appeals presently include State v. 
Edwards, presently under consideration for writ of certiorari, State v. Smith, decision 
still pending, and this case, State v. Prestwich. The cases have similar facts and 
circumstances which include the use of CIs in various settings, entering into the 
home of Appellant without a search warrant, and motions to suppress in each case. 
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One case settled prior to trial, and two went to trial, one with an entrapment defense 
instruction, this case, and one without, State v. Smith. It is evident from the trial 
court's rulings on the motions to suppress, that it relies heavily upon this Court's 
decisions in State v. Koury and State v. McArthur. Depending upon how the 
evidence is considered, the trial court's findings are supported in some degree in the 
record and testimony. There is, however, a perspective that should be considered. 
In many ways, much like it is difficult to see the forest when too close to the trees, 
there is much to this case that offers by way of metaphor the problem with the 
process. The trial court's decision not to find entrapment in each case or even to 
allow the fact finder to be instructed on entrapment as in this present case, comes 
from it considering only the immediate transaction that took place between the 
parties on the day of purchase while under surveillance. There is some evidence of 
harassment, but only from Appellant. What the trial court refused to consider was 
the scope, nature or impact of the long-term relationship, which required it to 
conclude that such a relationship by its very nature could be equivalent to the same 
factors traditionally observed or associated with the traditional entrapment case. 
Consequently, since the case did not fit the mold, the trial court did not see the 
issue. In fact, it felt that the matter was so implausible that in one case it felt no 
need to even allow an instruction on entrapment to be given for the sake of the 
Appellant. Appellant would argue that the fact finder should be given the opportunity 
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to consider such less than obvious factor the context of an instruction that allows the 
fact finder to address every aspect of each circumstance. Simply giving the 
instruction that parrots the statutory language is not sufficient in that it fails to offer 
to any jury the kind of consideration that would allow for meaningful deliberation. 
While insisting that the State has the ultimate burden of proof in the matter, the 
Appellant contends that the trial court should have allowed an instruction of 
entrapment that broadened its scope to include consideration of influences beyond 
the obvious such as long-term association or friendship. What is clear and obvious 
from the Court's rulings is that there seems to be very clearly expressed in these 
three cases, an inclination towards supporting the use of CIs by the drug task force 
without scrutiny or check and notwithstanding the ramifications in deteriorating fourth 
amendment protections such as securing a warrant prior to entny into a dwelling of 
an accused. The justification for doing so often falls short of reasonable standards 
of expectation at least for practices and procedures of law enforcement but reflect 
the belief that to catch a criminal one must become a criminal. The present use of 
CIs in this manner seems to be an extension of that kind of dark and twisted 
perspective. 
The Appellant argues that the Court of Appeals needs to view the matter in a 
more appropriate light. It should follow a course to not compromise or reduce the 
integrity of law enforcement high standards and continue to enjoy a reputation above 
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reproach complying with such standards. Implementing standards for use of CI 
throughout the state on a uniform basis would be a step in that direction and allow 
for more appropriate oversight with a view toward the continuing protection and 
preservation of individual liberties and constitutional rights consistent with the long 
established precedent throughout the country. Unless the Court of Appeals is willing 
to scrutinize the process and establish such oversight, it is hopeless to assume that 
the legislature will take such action and as demonstrated by the jury verdict in this 
case, highly unlikely that the public itself will ever fully appreciate the impact of its 
application. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above, the Appellant requests 
judgment in his favor reversing or remanding as the Court deems appropriate 
together with such and further relief as to this Court appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this | l ^ d a y of Awjpjk 20 PL . 
J'. BFWNgACKSON, 
Attofney foxAppellant Prestwich 
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